Objective: To examine the extent to which neuroscience accounts for mental disorders.
I n 2005, 2 leaders of psychiatric research in the United
States and Canada wrote an article in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) suggesting that psychiatry should redefine itself as a clinical discipline concerned with applied neuroscience. 1 This point of view would reduce the complexity of the mind to physiological and biochemical pathways, and limit psychosocial influences to a role as precipitants of disorder. Psychiatry would no longer differ from other branches of medicine.
My review will critically examine the critical assumptions behind these conclusions. Can the mind be reduced to the brain? Can the symptoms that psychiatrists treat be understood at the neural or molecular level?
The Separation of Psychiatry and Neurology
Consistent with their view of mental illnesses as brain disorders, the authors of the JAMA article 1 joined previous writers 2, 3 in making the recommendation that psychiatry and neurology should reunite into one specialty.
How did psychiatry become a discipline in its own right? In the early part of the 19th century, physicians who treated mental illness were not usually called psychiatrists. [4] [5] [6] If they worked in mental hospitals, they might have been called alienists. Even in the early 20th century, practitioners usually called their specialty neuropsychiatry or psychological medicine. 6 Sigmund Freud, a trained neurologist, treated neurotic symptoms but never called himself a psychiatrist.
The identity of psychiatry as a separate medical specialty emerged in the course of the 20th century. The American Psychiatric Association, founded in 1844, only adopted its present name in 1922, 7 and the Canadian Psychiatric Association was founded as recently as 1951.
Psychiatry grew and became more distinct as it was no longer practiced only in mental hospitals. The specialty became independent and gained influence with the public at large. 8 After the Second World War, most general hospitals opened wards and clinics for patients with mental disorders. This change reduced isolation, as practitioners were now in direct contact with their medical colleagues. Concurrently, psychiatry was being practiced in offices outside of hospitals.
However, the conceptual basis for considering psychiatry distinct from neurology took a long time to develop. Ultimately this depended on a distinction between mental illness and brain disorders. Psychiatrists treat diseases that primarily affect mental processes. While strokes can also disturb the mind, producing changes in mood, behaviour, and cognition, their most typical and dramatic effects are on motor and sensory function. Dementia, which produces primarily mental symptoms, has remained on a boundary between psychiatry and neurology.
Moreover, while neurology can map diseases in the brain, psychiatry has thus far been unable to do so. Neither schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, nor melancholia has been localized. Traditionally, mental disorders have been called functional because of an absence of correlation with anatomical or physiological changes.
However, the situation could change if research were to discover previously unknown brain mechanisms. And, in the past, when specific forms of brain pathology were discovered to be a cause of illness, patient care for these conditions moved from psychiatry to neurology, as happened in the case of tertiary syphilis. 6 Because of these differences, neurologists and psychiatrists have not practiced in the same way. Neurology looks for relations between observable signs and symptoms and localized anatomical lesions. Psychiatrists cannot make diagnoses in this way. In the absence of biological markers, they have been forced to take a phenomenological approach. While psychiatric phenomenology is fairly sophisticated, overt symptoms may or may not correspond to underlying endophenotypes. 9 If the differences between psychiatry and neurology are only an artifact of how well we understand the brain, they could be considered an historical accident. The gap could disappear if neuroscience were to eventually identify brain localizations similar to those known to neurology. 1 Or, as a neurological colleague once suggested to me, "We treat axons and you treat synapses."
In this scenario, a more complete understanding of mental illness would emerge from knowledge about brain mechanisms, and psychiatry would indeed develop into an applied neuroscience. And psychiatrists would not practice in a different way from other medical specialists. They would diagnose and treat illness based on biology, not psychology. Psychiatrists would be guided in their selection of treatment modalities by the results of neuroimaging (and other methods of measuring brain function). They would probably stop practicing psychotherapy. There would be little difference between neurology and psychiatry, and the 2 fields would eventually merge.
This vision of psychiatry could be many decades away, if indeed it ever comes to pass. Let us begin by examining the extent to which neuroscience actually accounts for mental illness.
Neuroscience and Mental Disorders
The idea that the mysteries of mental disorders can be resolved by a deeper understanding of neuroscience has become a predominant paradigm in modern psychiatry. This concept was greatly stimulated when the 1990s were declared the decade of the brain. 10 As psychological theories have fallen into decline, the zeitgeist of our field has come to favour genetically based etiological mechanisms and biological methods of treatment. 11 How well have these expectations been fulfilled? Regarding how the brain works, imaging has taught us a great deal about localization of function. We also have evidence from genetic studies that specific alleles influence brain development, as well as identification of how brain pathways are mediated by neurotransmitters and (or) proteins. 12 Nonetheless, these advances have not been translated into a better explanation of the etiology of major mental disorders. 13 It is possible that better answers will come with time. However, currently the results can only be described as discouraging. In general, while neuroimaging and neurochemistry point to possible correlates of pathology, most findings have been nonspecific. Biological research has not identified any specific mechanisms behind psychoses or mood disorders.
The hope that decoding the genome may quickly shed light on mental illness has also met with disappointment. 14, 15 There are several reasons why progress has been slow, and why promises of breakthrough discoveries have not been realized. First, the intricacy of brain processes is formidable, and it will take many decades to sort this problem out.
Moreover, the mechanisms of heritability for mental disorders involve complex interactions between genes. Thus, while almost all mental disorders have a considerable heritable component, 16 genetic pathways to illness involve multiple alleles. When individual alleles have been implicated, they usually account for no more than a small percentage of the variance. Thus, even with the recent application of whole genome scans, 17, 18 molecular genetic research has not identified specific pathways that can define major mental disorders.
Similarly, while neurotransmitters are well known to mediate synaptic pathways, research has not identified specific relations between any of these molecules and mental disorders. 19, 20 Neurotransmitters affect many receptors, and have complex interactions. It has never been shown that psychopathology can be reduced to chemical imbalances. 21 The hope to develop a molecular psychiatry remains a dream for the future.
A second reason for slow progress is that we do not know the precise phenotypes, or endophenotypes, that lie behind mental disorders. 22 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders' diagnoses are not diseases. In the absence of knowledge of their etiology and pathogenesis, disorders listed in this manual are little but syndromes. For that reason, one should not expect strong associations between any disorder and biological markers (as opposed to underlying traits and endophenotypes). More likely, research will need to work the other way around and use biological findings to provide the basis for a new and more precise classification of disorders-as has occurred in other medical specialties.
And, if we do find relations between biological markers and pathological processes, they are unlikely to be linear. Complex multifactorial pathways to disease, not single causes, are the rule in medicine. [23] [24] [25] One cannot account for diseases such as myocardial infarction or specific forms of cancer without invoking multiple risk factors and complex interactive pathways. For all the promise of research on DNA, nucleotides code for proteins, not diseases. We will not know the function of most genes until the complex problems of proteiomics are solved. 15 Finally, and crucially, the impact of genetic variations is almost never independent of context, in that outcomes are determined by gene-environment interactions. 15 Genes are turned on and off by environmental factors; a new science of epigenetics has been developed to examine these relations in detail. 26 In psychiatry, long-term prospective studies show that people are most likely to develop mental disorders when they are genetically vulnerable and exposed to stressful life experiences. 27, 28 This principle helps us to understand why neuroscience, by itself, is unlikely to ever provide a definitive understanding of mental illness. In stress-diathesis theory, 29 temperamental vulnerabilities can be entirely consistent with normality, and only produce pathology in interaction with environmental adversities.
The strongest arguments for explaining mental disorders through neuroscience have come from research on the most severe illnesses: schizophrenia, melancholic depression, and bipolar disorder. These conditions are known to be heritable, 30 even if their correlates in the brain are not established. Even so, the course of these disorders is not set at birth. For example, at least one-half of monozygotic twins are discordant for schizophrenia. 31 And, while biological interventions are by far the most useful methods of treatment for severe conditions, they are not in any way curative.
It is possible that the most severe mental disorders may turn out to be no less neurological than strokes or brain tumours. However, the situation is different for common, less severe mental disorders, such as nonmelancholic major depression, anxiety disorders, and substance abuse. While heritability plays a role in all these conditions, the environment accounts for at least one-half of the variance. 16 While these disorders are associated with genetic vulnerability, the pathways from temperament to illness cannot be understood without considering psychosocial factors. Moreover, pharmacological treatment, while useful, has had less striking success in these conditions than is the case for severe disorders, and psychotherapy plays an important role in their management. 11 All these intrinsic barriers prevent the scientific strategy of reducing psychiatry to neuroscience from ever being successful. In time, with the development of more powerful methods, research will no doubt tell us more about the relation between the brain and mental illness. However, a discrepancy between neuroscience and clinical phenomena is bound to persist because it is rooted in a conceptual gap between the mind and the brain.
Reductionism: 3 Philosophical Problems
The deeper questions about the relation of psychiatry to basic science are philosophical. The question of whether neuroscience is the primary basic discipline for psychiatry can be addressed in the context of 3 well-known questions.
First, can complex phenomena be broken down, reduced to, and fully explained by simpler mechanisms? Reductionism is a strategy with a long history of success, both in science and in medicine. Many processes can be illuminated by mechanisms at another level, as is psychology by biology, biology by chemistry, and chemistry by physics. Even so, the whole can be more than the sum of its parts. While larger-scale phenomena can be illuminated by smaller-scale mechanisms, they also need to be studied at their own level. 32 Models such as general systems theory 33 suggest that complex systems have emergent properties that are unpredictable from constituent elements. 34 Thus, even if the mind cannot exist without neural activity, this does not mean that thought or complex behaviour can be predicted at the neuronal level.
Neuroscience attempts to explain behavioural symptoms that psychiatrists see through brain mechanisms, reducing mind to the activity of neurons, chemical transmitters, and proteins. The new field of cognitive neuroscience is also studying associations between brain activity and thought. 35, 36 However, all these relations are ultimately associations, not explanations.
The second philosophical issue is the mind-brain problem: whether the mind and thought are equivalent to activity in the Psychiatry and Neuroscience
The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, Vol 54, No 8, August 2009 W brain. 37 Most neuroscientists, with only a few exceptions, 38 have taken this equivalence for granted. However, if reductionism is wrong, the mind cannot be reduced to the brain, and should not be seen as nothing but the effects of neuronal activity. The alternative view is that mental processes, expressed in thought, emotion, and behaviour, are emergent properties of the brain. They cannot be understood in the same way as the sensory and motor processes dealt with by neurology.
The third philosophical problem concerns consciousness. Chalmers 39 described the question of whether neuroscience can explain consciousness as the hard problem (as opposed to easy problems, such as accounting for simpler mental phenomena). There has been a vigorous debate between people who view consciousness as entirely reducible to neural activity, 40 and those who consider it as an emergent property that allows for free will. 41, 42 The latter view is not dualistic; the mind cannot exist without the brain. It simply states that mental processes cannot be reduced to or fully explained by the activity of neurons. Thus features deriving from a higher (more complex) level of analysis cannot be accounted for at a lower (simpler) level.
In this view, the symptoms of mental disorders reflect emergent properties of the mind rather than direct effects of specific pathways or transmitters. Depression or delusions can be influenced by genetic and molecular changes. However, it does not follow that they are determined or explained by them. Understanding these phenomena requires research at a mental level and not just at a molecular level.
Moreover, brain research is not the only basic science on which psychiatry can draw. Research that examines phenomena at a mental level is no less empirical. Researchers in psychology have always been deeply concerned about valid measurement and replicability. Nonetheless, by and large, psychiatrists know less about psychology than about neuroscience. To understand mental disorders, we need links with other disciplines.
In fact, psychiatry has long benefited from long-standing and fruitful interfaces with the social sciences. Developmental psychology, experimental psychology, social psychology, sociology, and anthropology all have something to tell us about mental disorders. These disciplines would be enriched by developing their own links with neuroscience, but all examine human behaviour at an emergent level.
Neuroscience and the Practice of Psychiatry
Several decades ago, George Engel, a prominent American psychiatrist, 43 became concerned about how the theory and practice of medicine was evolving to follow a narrow biomedical model. Engel's biopsychosocial model of psychiatry 44 conceptualizes mental disorders as arising from interactions between biological, psychological, and social factors, and as supporting a broad range of treatments, including psychotherapy and social interventions. However, this is a point of view, in Shakespeare's words, that has been "more honoured in the breach than the observance" (Hamlet, I iv). Researchers have increasingly placed their hopes on neuroscience for answers. Even psychoanalysts hope that their discipline can be redefined as a method to change brain circuitry. 45 What lies behind this trend is that psychiatry has chosen to identify itself more closely with medicine. In some ways, this neo-Krapelinian movement 46 was salutary in reversing the overemphasis on psychological mechanisms that marked psychiatry's past. However, the biomedical approach became a new orthodoxy. A well-known proponent of this view 47 once wrote an article entitled "Biological Psychiatry: Is There Any Other Kind?"
In the JAMA article 1 proposing that psychiatry and neurology reunite, the authors never once mentioned the words psychology or psychotherapy. While paying lip service to gene-environment interactions, the thrust of neuroscience research rarely takes into account the role of psychosocial stressors. And when they have been included, their measurement can sometimes be simplistic.
Moreover, a reductionistic view of the field, reducing psychiatry to clinical neuroscience, tends to support an almost exclusive dependence on drugs in practice. However, while psychopharmacology has brought relief to millions, drugs have only rarely produced full remissions of any mental disorder. Failure to put psychosocial issues on the same level has led psychiatry to ignore evidence for the efficacy of psychotherapies, which is as strong as for drugs. 48 Philosophical reductionism leads to a less than fully effective approach to practice. While psychiatry used to be brainless, it has now become mindless. 23 As physicians treating mental disorders reject a biopsychosocial model in favour of a strictly biomedical model, the patients they treat are not receiving the full range of evidence-based treatments. To paraphrase a famous phrase from the Vietnam War, defining our specialty as clinical neuroscience would destroy psychiatry in order to save it.
